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INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS SECTION
Buyer Beware: The United States No
Longer Wants Foreign Capital to Fund
Corporate Acquisitions*
JOSEPH E. REECE**
INTRODUCTION
Instead of being viewed as a rival, [foreign investment] ought to be
considered as a most valuable auxiliary, conducing to put into motion
a greater quantity of productive labor, and a greater portion of useful
enterprise than could exist without it.'
Alexander Hamilton
The boundary lines of the world's primary financial markets are be-
coming ever blurred. No longer can we concern ourselves with the activi-
ties in corporate America alone. Today, it is rare when a major corpora-
tion does not do business in all of the major financial centers throughout
the world.
A good example of this increasing internationalization can be seen in
the world-wide debt market. Today it is common to find IBM commercial
paper2 being traded and held in Tokyo, Exxon Eurodollar notes3 being
* The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims
responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission or of the author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
** Special Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 994 (1791).
2. Stigum, Money Market Instruments, in THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES
217, 232 (1983). This essay contains the following discussion on commercial paper:
Commercial paper, whoever the issuer and whatever the precise form it takes,
is an unsecured promissory note with a fixed maturity. In plain English, the
issuer of commercial paper (the borrower) promises to pay the buyer (the
lender) some fixed amount on some future date. But issuers pledge no assets -
only liquidity and established earning power - to guarantee that they will
make good on their promises to pay. Traditionally, commercial paper resem-
bled in form a Treasury bill; it was a negotiable, non-interest-bearing note is-
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sold in London 4 and sovereign debt being placed with large money center
banks in New York.
The international bond market has undergone an explosive increase
in size.' For example, in 1980, the total amount of bonds issued interna-
tionally was $38.3 billion.' By 1986 this figure had increased to $225.4
billion.7 It appears that the world financial markets are in an era of un-
precedented internationalization and growth.
sued at a discount from face value and redeemed at maturity for full face
value. Today, however, a lot of paper is interest bearing. For the investor the
major difference between bills and paper is that paper carries some small risk
of default because the issuer is a private firm, whereas the risk of default on
bills is zero for all intents and purposes.
Firms selling commercial paper frequently expect to roll over their paper
as it matures; that is, they plan to get money to pay off maturing paper by
issuing new paper. Since there is always the danger that an adverse turn in the
paper market might make doing so difficult or inordinately expensive, most
paper issuers back their outstanding paper with bank lines of credit; they get a
promise from a bank or banks to lend them at any time an amount equal to
their outstanding paper. Issuers normally pay for this service in one of several
ways: by holding at their line banks compensating deposit balances equal to
some percentage of their total credit lines; by paying an annual fee equal to
some small percentage of their outstanding lines; or through some mix of bal-
ances and fees.
3. See, STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE SEN-
ATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS G-3
(hereinafter "INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY"). A generally accepted definition of a Eurodollar
Security is a debt security issued multinationally through an international syndicate of
banks or securities firms in a currency other than that of the country in which the bond is
issued. According to the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the all inclusive
term Eurobond has several derivatives and variations such as Eurodollar bond, Euroyen
bond, Euro-DM bond, etc. These names serve to indicate the currency in which the offering
is denominated. Compare this to a foreign bond which is a debt security issued in a country
other than that of the issuer and sold through a syndicate of banks or securities firms with
the instrument being denominated in the currency of the country in which such bond is
being sold.
4. The Eurodollar market was originally established by London banks in the early
1960's. This market was developed primarily because major multinational corporations
needed to match cash needs with the currency inflows and expenditures caused by overseas
expansion. Major corporations could offer a higher rate of return in London than in the
United States and still have a lower total debt cost because London had no requirements for
central bank insurance or participation. This market is primarily a debt market. The trans-
actions involved were generally paper swaps between issuing corporations and large London
banks. This market was a bombshell to the health of United States financial markets. As a
result of the growth of this market, the Kennedy administration created the Fowler Task
Force to examine what actions the United States could undertake to counteract the outflow
of United States dollars to foreign investments.
5. See INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY, supra note 3, at G-5. The staff of the Securities
and Exchange Commission has defined an international bond as a debt security originally
issued outside the country of the borrower. These securities generally take the form of
Eurobonds or Foreign bonds.
6. Id. at II-1.
7. Id. at 11-2.
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Nowhere is this trend more evident than in the area of international
mergers and acquisitions. As in other areas of internationalization of the
financial markets, the United States is at the forefront of this activity.
For example, in 1980, United States companies were involved in 116 deals
where foreign companies were acquired with a total dollar value of over
$1 billion.' By 1987 these numbers had increased to 190 deals valued at
approximately $7.1 billion.' Although this represents an increase of over
seven-fold, these numbers pale in comparison with the recent activity of
foreign entities acquiring United States corporations. Many of our coun-
try's major multinational corporations have recently been the target of
acquisitions by foreign entities and individuals.'" In 1980, foreign ac-
quirers participated in 167 deals valued at $6.7 billion." By 1988 these
numbers had risen to 447 deals valued at over $60.8 billion.", As the sta-
tistics illustrate, foreign investment in the United States has achieved a
significant presence in corporate America.'
3
As a result of this activity, political pressure mounted resulting in the
passage of an obscure amendment, section 5021, to the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988,' commonly referred to as the Exon-
Florio Amendment ("Exon-Florio"). This trade act is an amendment to
the Defense Production Act of 1950, and in essence, gives the President
the power to suspend, prohibit or dismantle mergers, acquisitions and
takeovers of United States companies by foreign investment which
threaten "national security." 5 On its face, this law does not appear to be
problematic for corporate acquisitions that do not involve national secur-
ity. However, given the broad discretionary power that has been granted,
it is possible that this law will have far reaching and potentially onerous
effects on the United States capital markets.
This article will explore the ramifications for and application to for-
eign acquirers of Exon-Florio. First, a historical framework will provide
8. 1988 Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May/Jun. 1989, at 60 (hereinafter "M & A").
This represents an increase of over 488%.
9. Id.
10. For a list of the twenty-five largest acquisitions made by foreign entities in the
United States in 1988, see M & A, supra note 8. Companies such as Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co., Federated Department Stores, CBS Records Group, Tropicana Products Inc.,
Brooks Brothers Inc., and Kidde Inc., were all acquired by foreign entities in 1988. As the
names illustrate, many of the companies involved are ones that the American consumers
deal with on a daily basis. As such, the recent flurry of international acquisitions affect all of
us. Given the high profile of these companies, the stage was set for United States legislative
action.
11. See M & A, supra note 8, at 60.
12. Id.
13. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
14. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107.
15. See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text. This term has not been defined.
Therein lies what may be the largest potential problem for foreign acquirers of United
States companies.
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an overview of the factors that led to the passage of Exon-Florio.' This is
followed by a discussion of the coverage, scope and application of Exon-
Florio.' 7 Finally, the article will discuss the problems inherent in Exon-
Florio, the proposed regulations and the burdens that may be placed on
foreign acquirers.' 8
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
Historically, the United States has encouraged foreign investment in
this country.19 In its earliest years, the United States not only encouraged
direct foreign investment, our fledgling nation was extremely dependent
upon such funds.2 0 Indeed, as Alexander Hamilton noted in 1791, foreign
investment was a valuable addition to our capital hungry nation."' Thus,
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, foreign capital was a ma-
jor factor in the economic development of this country. For example, it
was a loan from England, France and the Netherlands that permitted the
United States to con~plete the Louisiana Purchase in 1803.22 Throughout
the early part of the nineteenth century, European investment was the
driving force behind the creation of our nation's infrastructure.2" Between
1820 and 1840, investment in United States factories rose from $50 mil-
lion to $250 million."' As with our nation's infrastructure, the bulk of
these funds were provided by foreign investors. During the 1880's, it is
estimated that nearly two-thirds of all new investment in railroads was
16. See supra notes 19-71 and accompanying text.
17. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
18. See supra notes 82-114 and accompanying text.
19. See Berger, Applying Uniform Margin Requirements to Foreign Entities Attempt-
ing to Acquire U.S. Corporations, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 543 (1984).
20. For a complete discussion of the historical development of Trade law and tariffs see
Note, The Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in United States Foreign Trade
Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1418 (1971). Early American investment policy focused on international
trade and primarily consisted of high tariffs to protect our nation's youthful industry. In the
middle to late 1700's, this paternalistic approach was necessary because foreign products
were frequently better made at a cheaper price. See also F. ROOT, R. KRAMER & M. D'ARLIN,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE (1966).
21. See ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 1. Although Hamilton was a forceful advocate
favoring direct foreign investment, he may have been promoting more than just national
pride. In recent years, Hamilton's zealous support for foreign investment has been chal-
lenged as motivated by the potential for personal pecuniary gain as opposed to promoting
the long term fiscal health of our nation. See K. CROWE, AMERICA FOR SALE 248 (1978).
22. See Boorstin, Foreign Investments in America, 2 EDITORIAL RES. REP. 571 (1974)
(hereinafter "Boorstin"). An $11.25 million loan from England, France and the Netherlands
provided Thomas Jefferson with the funds needed to complete the land purchase that was a
dramatic step in the emergence of our young nation as a potential world power.
23. Id. at 572. Railroads, canals, bridges and roads were all financed primarily with
European capital. For example, the Erie Canal was made possible by a sale of state bonds
sold on the London Market. This was significant given that the Erie was the first American
canal to be a commercial success. By proving a commercial success, the Erie was an excel-
lent selling point for other infrastructure promoters.
24. Id.
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being made by Europeans."
This financing of America by the Europeans continued unabashedly
until the beginning of World War I. The war was the primary cause of a
dramatic change in capital flows into the United States. To pay for war-
time needs, many of Europe's creditor countries liquidated a large portion
of American investments that had been amassed in the prior century.
Foreign investment in the United States went from $7.2 billion in 1914 to
$4 billion at the end of 1919.26
Although America's growth for over two centuries had been made
possible with the utilization of foreign investment, the infusion of this
foreign capital was not always viewed as a welcome event. As early as
1791, legislation aimed at curbing foreign investment was enacted. In cre-
ating the first Bank of the United States, laws were enacted that prohib-
ited the election of aliens as directors and also barred the giving of prox-
ies by nonresidents of the United States.2 7
Again during the 1850's, attention was focused upon the large influx
of foreign investment."8 By 1887, public concern had again culminated in
25. D. ADLER, BRITISH INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN RAILWAYS, 1834-1898 (1970); Boorstin,
supra note 22, at 572. In discussing the importance of foreign investment to the develop-
ment of our nation, Daniel Boorstin, librarian for the Library of Congress, noted:
By 1854, foreign investors held approximately one-half of the federal and state
and one-quarter of the municipal debts. Their interest in private enterprise
was much smaller. The discovery of gold in California, however, sparked activ-
ity in trade, manufacturing, and railroad building which started a new flow of
European capital to America. The regularity of such investment was sometimes
interrupted by panics and the disclosures of the folly of American promoters;
in 1869, for example, representatives of the Memphis, El Paso, and Pacific
Railroad sold some $5 million worth of bonds on the Paris Bourse, having
widely advertised their great transcontinental line which turned out to be just
three miles long.
After that fiasco French investments in American railroads were negligible,
but the English and Dutch remained enthusiastic and for a long time held con-
trolling interests in the Illinois Central, the New York and Erie, the Philadel-
phia and Reading, and others. For more than three-quarters of a century Brit-
ish investors were the principal buyers of American railway securities. By 1914,
when securities and direct investments by Europeans in America totalled $7
billion, well over half of it was in railroads ....
See also North, International Capital Flows and the Development of the American West,
16 J. ECON. HIST. 493 (1956).
26. Boorstin, supra note 22, at 573.
27. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, Ch. X, §§ 7 (I), (III), 1 Stat. 193. This fear of foreign control
was still present in 1816. In creating the second Bank of the United States, prohibitions
similar to the ones attached to the first Bank were also included in the enacting legislation
of the second Bank. Act of Apr. 10, 1816, Ch. XLIV, §§ 11(1), (16), 3 Stat. 271, 274. But cf.
National Bank Act, Ch. CVI, §§ 9, 10, 13 Stat. 102 (1864). These prohibitions were not
entirely successful. By 1841, 56% of the Bank of the United States was owned by foreign
investors. For a better discussion of the foreign investment in the Bank of the United States
during the 1800's see LEWIS, AMERICA'S STAKE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS 14-15 (1938).
28. See Boorstin, supra note 22. The major investments in the railroads were the pri-
mary area of concern during this era. In response to this purchase of America by foreign
1990
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the passage of legislation that regulated foreign investment. The Alien
Land Law of 1887 prohibited the purchase of land in federal territories
by foreign investors.2 9 Regulation of foreign investment was essentially
ignored from the early 1900's through World War II. Legislation was en-
acted mainly in those industries the federal government considered im-
portant to national security."0 After World War II, the United States
again actively encouraged foreign investment. The United States policy
during this era can best be understood by a review of the following ex-
cerpt from the Mutual Security Act of 1954:
[This Act authorizes the President to] . . . accelerate a program of
negotiating treaties for commerce and trade . .. which shall include
provisions to encourage and facilitate the flow of private investment
and its equitable treatment in nations participating in programs
under this Act .... 31
As a result of this encouragement, United States investors began
making significant offshore investments. Although the United States was
encouraging the inflow of foreign investment capital, we were experienc-
ing a significant balance of payments deficit. Given this turn of events,
additional legislation was promulgated to encourage investment in the
United States by foreigners and by United States citizens and to limit the
outflow of capital. The principal legislation at this time was the Interest
Equalization Tax of 1964.32 This tax imposed a penalty on the purchase
investors, the Know-Nothing Party was supporting discriminatory taxation of foreign in-
vestment in the United States. Although unsuccessful in its efforts, the Know-Nothing
Party nevertheless raised the general awareness of foreign investment in the United States.
See generally ADLER, BRITISH INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN RAILWAYS: 1834-1898, 10-11 (1970).
29. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, Ch. 340, § 1, 24 Stat. 476. Other legislation during this period
includes: Homestead Act of 1862, Ch. LXXV, § 1, 12 Stat. 392; Desert Land Act of 1877, Act
of Mar. 3, 1877, Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377, amended by 43 U.S.C. § 321 et seq. (1970); and
Natural Resources Act of 1887, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, Ch. 340, § 1, 24 Stat. 476. Briefly, the
Homestead Act allowed only citizens of the United States to enter public lands for the pur-
pose of homesteading. The Desert Land Act was similar to the Homestead Act in that it
authorized only United States citizens the right to reclaim public desert land. Finally, the
Natural Resources Act was also directed to the prohibition of public land ownership and
usage by non-citizens of the United States.
30. Industries where foreign investment was regulated, restricted or prohibited include:
Atomic Energy, 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1982); Air Transportation, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(13),
1302(13), 1378(a)(4), (f), 1401(b), 1508(b) (1982); Coastal Shipping and Trade Activities, 46
U.S.C. §§ 11, 252, 289, 8654, 883, 888 (1982); Ship Building, 49 U.S.C. §§ 808, 835 (1982);
Leases on Federal Mineral Lands, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 24, 72, 181, 352 (1982); Radio and Televi-
sion Industries, 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1982); and Military Aircraft Production, 10 U.S.C. § 2272(f)
(1982). For a complete discussion of industries where foreign investment is regulated see
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 333-729 (Marans, Williams and Mirabito, eds.
1977). See also Andrews, An Evaluation of the Need for Further Statutory Controls on
Direct Foreign Investment in the United States, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 147 (1974).
31. Mutual Security Act of 1954, Pub. L. 665-937, 68 Stat. 832.
32. Act of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809, amended by Pub. L. No. 90-
59, 81 Stat. 145 (1967) (formerly codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4811 et seq., repealed by Act of
Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1814, Title XIX, § 1904(a)(21)(A)).
VOL. 18:2
FOREIGN CAPITAL
of foreign securities by United States citizens. Additionally, a Presidential
Task Force was created to discuss and propose methods to increase for-
eign investment in the United States."3
In the early 1970's the amount of foreign investment in the United
States increased tremendously. This increase was due to two key factors.
First, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
emerged during this period as a cohesive and dominant economic and po-
litical force. This event coupled with the implementation of a sustained
oil embargo caused petroleum prices to soar. As a result, a significant pool
of dollars became available for investment by the OPEC nations.3 Sec-
ond, the dollar suffered a significant devaluation compared to the curren-
cies of our major trading partners.3 Also, corporate securities prices were
depressed in the early 1970's.1s
Other factors making the United States an inviting target for foreign
investment included attractive rates of return for foreign investors, a sta-
ble political climate and fair laws under which returns could be favorably
achieved.3 7 Overall, during the last twenty-five years, the United States
has been a very inviting investment choice for well capitalized foreign
investors."'
These international financial developments did not go unnoticed. By
1974, Congress began a major inquiry into the degree of foreign invest-
ment in the United States.3 ' As a result of this attention, several pieces of
33. See H.R. Doc. No. 141, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963) (Message from the President
of the United States transmitting a special message on Balance of Payments).
34. See Arab Banks Grow, Bus. WK., Oct. 6, 1980, at 70, 72. This trend continued un-
abated through the late 1970's. For example, in 1978 the estimated dollar surpluses held by
Arab oil exporters equaled $5.3 billion. However, by 1980, estimates for the surpluses had
ballooned to $120 billion. As a result of this surplus, the Arab oil nations became a potent
force in the international financial markets. By 1980, Arabic members of OPEC had in-
vested $340 billion worldwide. This amount was three times greater than their cumulative
worldwide investment in 1975.
35. See E. FRY, FINANCIAL INVASION OF THE U.S.A.: A THREAT TO AMERICAN SOCIETY 36
(1980). From 1971 to 1978, the dollar declined 81% against the German mark and 63%
against the Japanese yen.
36. For a complete discussion of the economic factors that led to an increase of foreign
investment in the early 1970's, see ZAGARIS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 8-10
(1980).
37. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. Many of these same factors are pre-
sent today in the United States. Currency valuations are presently in favor of the United
States trading partners, we are presently suffering a huge trade and balance of payment
deficit and many investors still view the United States markets as the deepest and most
liquid. As such, we are again seeing a large influx of foreign funds into our financial markets.
38. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURI-
TIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1963). In 1963, the Securities and
Exchange Commission noted in a study that foreign funds were an important source of capi-
tal for large, unregulated borrowers.
39. See generally Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Other major hearings and legislative proposals include: Hearings on
1990
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legislation were debated before Congress in 1974. Although not enacted,
perhaps the most significant in terms of potential effect was the Foreign
Investors Limitation Act of 1974.40 This proposed Act would have been
an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.41 Briefly, this
proposal would have prohibited foreign investors from acquiring more
than five percent of any voting securities, or thirty-five percent of non-
voting securities of any company whose securities were registered under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.42 Although it restricted the foreign
acquisition of United States companies, the bill was silent on the ability
of a foreign entity to create a wholly owned subsidiary in the United
States. Thus, it appears as if the Foreign Investors Limitation Act of 1974
wanted to maintain the historical encouragement of foreign investment
while at the same time protect established United States industries. In
fact, the stated purpose of this bill was to encourage diversification of
foreign investments in domestic industries and avoid the pitfalls that
would occur with the foreign control of United States industries. 3
The legislation that was enacted has subsequently had a profound
effect. Not in immediate results, but in laying the groundwork for the
application of the Exon-Florio Amendment. Given the lack of any useful
information concerning foreign investment in the United States, Congress
directed the Commerce Department to study such investment and pre-
pare a complete report. The enacting legislation for this survey was the
Foreign Investment in the United States Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic
Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)(the "Culver
Subcommittee"); Hearings on S. 2840 Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)(the "Inouye
Subcommittee"); Hearings on S. 3955 Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)(the "Metzen-
baum Subcommittee"); Hearings on S. 425 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975)(the "Williams Subcommittee"); Hearings on S. 425, S. 953, S. 995 and S. 1303
Before the Subcommittee on Int'l Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)(the "Stevenson Subcommittee"); Hearings
on S. 329, S. 995, S. 1303 and Amendment No. 393 Before the Subcommittee on Foreign
Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975)(the "Inouye Subcommittee"). A review of the Congressional hearings will illustrate
the frequently vocalized concern over the lack of any usable data concerning the extent and
effects of direct foreign investment in the United States.
40. H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. H21,425 (1973). The other major
legislation proposed was the Energy and Defense Industry Production Act, H.R. 12040, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. H42655 (1973)(hereinafter Production Act). This bill was
less restrictive than the Foreign Investors Limitation Act. The focus of the Production Act
was to regulate foreign investment in the energy or defense industries. The Production Act
stated that it would be illegal for a non-citizen of the United States or a foreign controlled
entity to control a United States company (the Production Act defines control as ownership
of 10% or greater of a company's voting securities).
41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1989)).
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
43. Id.
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Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 ("1974 Act").4" As a result of this
directive, the Commerce Department compiled a nine volume treatise on
direct foreign investment that was released in 1976."1 As a direct result of
the information contained in the 1976 study, Congress enacted the Inter-
national Investment Survey Act of 1976 ("1976 Act"). 6 This law author-
ized the ongoing collection of comprehensive data concerning foreign di-
rect investment in the United States. Specifically, this act vested the
authority in the President to, "conduct a regular data collection program
to secure current information on international capital flows and other in-
formation related to international investment .. .
In an Executive Order, the President subsequently delegated his au-
thority to the Department of Commerce for the promulgation and imple-
mentation of regulations concerning such information gathering tasks.'
In addition to the legislative activity surrounding the 1974 and 1976 Acts
was the 1975 Presidential creation of the Committee on Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States (CFIUS).' 9 CFIUS was formed principally to
be an advisory and information gathering entity. ° With the passage of
44. Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, §§ 1-11, 88 Stat. 1450-60
(1974). The principal purpose of this act was to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to
prepare a report for Congress that would focus on direct foreign investment in the United
States. However, as a review of the subsequent law and its application shows, the Foreign
Investment Study Act of 1974 was to be the first in a long chain of far reaching laws con-
cerning foreign investment in the United States.
45. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. (1976) (report
of the Secretary of Commerce to the Congress in Compliance with Foreign Investment
Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450).
46. Internal Investment Survey Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-472, § 2, 90 Stat. 2059-64
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1979 & Supp. 1983)). The principal pur-
pose of the Survey Act was to require benchmark surveys of direct and portfolio foreign
investment in the United States and of United States direct investments abroad. These
surveys were to be completed at least once every five years and provide for the collection of
data on an on-going basis. See 22 U.S.C. § 3103 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
47. 22 U.S.C. § 3103(a)(1) (1979 & Supp. 1983). The stated purpose of this legislation
was to provide,
clear and unambiguous authority for the President to collect information on
international investment and to provide analyses of such information to the
Congress, the executive agencies, and the general public.
22 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (1979 & Supp. 1983).
The language in this Act expressly stated that its purpose was not to, "restrain or deter
foreign investment in the United States or United States investment abroad." 22 U.S.C. §
3101(c) (1979 & Supp. 1983).
48. Exec. Order No. 11,961, 3 C.F.R. 86 (1978), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,013, 3
C.F.R. 147 (1978).
49. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975), amended by Exec. Order No.
12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
50. Id. As originally created, CFIUS consisted of a representative, whose status shall
not be below an Assistant Secretary, designated by the Secretaries of State, Treasury, De-
fense, Commerce, the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs and the Executive
Director of the Council on International Economic Policy. In 1980, the Assistant to the
President for Economic Affairs and the Executive Director of the Council on International
Economic Policy were replaced by the United States Trade Representative and the
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the 1976 Act, Congress insured that there would be a steady flow of direct
investment data to CFIUS. Thus, through the actions of Congress and
President Ford, a permanent mechanism was created to monitor foreign
investment in the United States.51
Although the events in the world oil and financial markets created a
general increase in the concern about foreign investment in the United
States, the historic support for foreign investment in the United States
was left relatively unscathed. The Carter Administration in the late
1970's continued to espouse the international financial benefits of foreign
investment. An indication of our country's policy during this era can be
seen in the Declaration issued at the conclusion of the Bonn Economic
Summit and signed by the President on July 17, 1978. The Declaration
stated:
We underline our willingness to increase our co-operation in the field
of foreign private investment flows among industrialized countries and
between them and developing countries. We will intensify work for
further agreements in the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development] and elsewhere.52
By 1980, the concern of the 1970's and the active governmental quest
for more information about direct foreign investment in the United
States had virtually evaporated.
With the onset of the Reagan era, corporate America had begun to
reassert itself. In 1982, American financial markets began what was to be
the longest bull market in history. With prosperous times, less of a threat
was seen coming from foreign investment in the United States. In Sep-
tember of 1983, President Reagan released what he described as a "major
statement on international investment." 3 This statement, developed by
the Senior Interdepartmental Group on International Economic Policy,
contained a direct welcome to foreign investment in the United States. In
that statement, the following policy was set forth concerning foreign in-
vestment in this country:
The United States has consistently welcomed foreign direct invest-
Chairperson of the Council of Economic Advisers. See Exec. Order No. 12,188, § 1-105.
Prior Executive Orders and Determination, §§ (f)(1) and (2) at 992.
51. Another law promulgated during this era was the Agricultural Foreign Investment
Disclosure Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, 92 Stat. 1263 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3501-3508
(1988)). See 124 CONG. REc. 31,673-682 (1979) (hereinafter "AFIDA"). This legislation was
enacted in response to the concerns voiced by rural constituencies that an increase of the
foreign investment in United States agricultural land was causing a dramatic escalation in
land prices. Like the International Investment Survey Act of 1976, AFIDA was promulgated
for the purpose of establishing a nationwide monitoring program. This program was to pro-
vide statistical data covering the extent and impact of foreign investment in United States
agricultural land. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 29,029 (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 47,526 (1979); 45 Fed.
Reg. 61,15 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 77,79 (1980); 49 Fed. Reg. 35,073 (1984).
52. 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1314 (July 24, 1978). In addition to President Carter,
this Declaration was also signed by the leaders of England, France and West Germany.
53. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1214 (Sept. 9, 1983).
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ment in this country. Such investment provides substantial benefits to
the United States. Therefore, the United States fosters a domestic ec-
onomic climate which is conducive to investment. We provide foreign
investors fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory treatment under our
laws and regulations. We maintain exceptions to such treatment only
as are necessary to protect our security and related interests and
which are consistent with our international legal obligations."
Thus, during the Reagan years, foreign investment was vigorously en-
couraged. As the merger and acquisition figures for 1980-1988 illustrate,
foreign investment flowed into the United States at unprecedented
rates.5 This growing foreign presence in American industry again served
to fuel the fires of alarm.
During this era, increased attention was again focused upon the mag-
nitude of foreign investment in the United States. 6 Although the Reagan
administration hailed foreign investment as a welcome tool in our quest
for expansion, other economic pundits warned that the United States was
becoming addicted to foreign capital." There were fears that
overdependence on foreign investment would actually weaken our coun-
try's fiscal health. Further, there were suggestions that such dependence
could also cause the United States to be the subject of undue foreign po-
litical pressure which could undermine our political independence. 8 Cou-
pled with these concerns were the questions about national security.
Recently, two proposed transactions arose that sparked extensive de-
bate about the desirability of direct foreign investment in the United
States. First was the proposed acquisition of eighty percent of Fairchild
Semiconductor Corp. ("Fairchild") by Fujitsu, Ltd. ("Fujitsu") of Japan.
This acquisition was potentially very problematic because if consum-
mated, the deal would have provided the Japanese with advanced tech-
nology in an area previously dominated by the United States. There was
concern that the Japanese would use this information in an attempt to
dominate an industrial market. On October 24, 1986, Fujitsu and
Fairchild announced the proposed transaction. 9 There was an immediate
increase in the number of commentaries on the effect of foreign invest-
54. Id. at 1216.
55. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
56. MARTIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA: How FOREIGN MONEY IS CHANG-
ING THE FACE OF OUR NATION 6 (1988) (hereinafter "Tolchin").
57. Id.
58. Id. An example of this potential problem was illustrated in April, 1987, when Paul
Volcker disclosed that the Federal Reserve Board had decided to raise short-term interest
rates. The rationale for this action was so the depreciation of the United States dollar would
be slowed which would then make United States investments more attractive to foreign
investors. In response to this action, Norman Robertson, Chief Economist at the Mellon
Bank, stated: "Federal policy is increasingly influenced and even dictated by the needs of
our foreign creditors." See Blustein, Dollar Looms Bigger in Fed's Decision at Risk of Re-
cession, Wall St. J., May 19, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
59. Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1986, at C1, col. 3.
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ment in the United States. Most of the vocalized concerns were focused
upon the potential effect the acquisition would have on our nation's na-
tional security."0 Opponents of the Fujitsu purchase also noted that the
proposed transaction would make Fujitsu the world leader in the produc-
tion of semiconductors."' Finally, the fact that Fairchild's defense elec-
tronics subsidiary provided more than $100 million of high-speed cir-
cuitry annually to defense contractors spawned a wave of anti-foreign
investment sentiment.
6 2
Because Fairchild was in an industry where America held a perceived
edge in technology over Japan, the proposed acquisition generated exten-
sive debate and political attention. On November 8, 1986, the CFIUS
Task Force announced that it would review the proposed merger.6 Al-
though many of the above-referenced factors were considered, the areas
that were ultimately the primary focus of concern in the proposed Fujitsu
transaction were trade and national policy. As attention was focused on
the Fujitsu transaction, many commentators noted that America's tradi-
tional open door policy on foreign investment was seldom reciprocated.6
As a result of the negative publicity and political inquiry, Fujitsu ul-
timately decided to terminate negotiations and abort the acquisition of
Fairchild.6 5 Although this retreat by Fujitsu stemmed the flow of anti-
Japanese investment sentiment, the problem was still on the front line of
political agendas.
The second transaction was the proposed acquisition of the Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Company by the British financier, Sir James Goldsmith.
Goodyear is a well known industrial company headquartered in Akron,
Ohio. Given Akron's and the entire midwest's quest for economic resur-
gence in the early to mid-1980's, 6' this proposed transaction was aggres-
60. See, e.g., Pollack, Fujitsu Chip Deal Draws More Flak, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1987, at
D1, col. 3.
61. Tolchin, supra note 57, at 10. At the time of the proposed acquisition, Fujitsu
owned half of Amdahl, an American computer company.
62. Id. This concern is very interesting given that at the time of Fujitsu's proposed
purchase, Fairchild was owned by the United States affiliate of Schlumberger, Ltd. (a large
French oil services company.) Thus, it would appear as if foreign ownership of sensitive
technology was not per se objectionable. Instead, the concerns were focused upon Japanese
acquisition of sensitive technology. There were fears that if Fujitsu gained access to
Fairchild's technological expertise, it would use such knowledge to eliminate United States
competition in a key area of technology.
63. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1986, at 39, col. 1.
64. Tolchin, supra note 57, at 12. Auerbach, Cabinet to Weigh Sale of Chip Firm,
Wash. Post, March 12, 1987, at El, col. 3. In announcing that the Department of Commerce
would investigate the Fujitsu transaction and the public policy concerning America's open-
door to foreign investment, Commerce Secretary Baldridge stated that Fujitsu's ownership
of Fairchild would increase Japan's "ability to compete for United States supercomputer
sales while blocking United States makers from a large share of Japan's market."
65. Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No. 67 (April 10, 1987).
66. The entire midwest was hit extremely hard by the recession of the early 1980's.
Detroit was suffering due to its reliance on the automobile industry. Cleveland, Akron,
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sively opposed by the residents of Akron, of Ohio, and by the federal
government.6 7
In responding to this outpouring of public support for Goodyear, the
House Subcommittee on Monopolies convened special public hearings to
review the Goldsmith bid.6" These meetings provided a public forum for
the debate concerning the merits of an open door policy to direct foreign
investment in the United States. Although the hearings were inconclu-
sive, the proceedings were widely publicized and served to heighten
America's awareness of the level of direct foreign investment and to fuel
the fires of fear that foreigners were buying up America."'
Ultimately, Goldsmith withdrew his bid for Goodyear and sold his
shares back to the company for a substantial profit. Thus, while Gold-
smith was able to avoid public wrath and congressional action by selling
out his Goodyear holdings, the public hearings spawned by his actions
brought America's direct foreign investment policy to the forefront of leg-
islative agendas.
The Fujitsu and Goodyear debates were important in several re-
spects. First, it was the first time in recent memory that a major contro-
versy erupted after a proposed foreign investment.7" Second, before
Fujitsu, foreign investment in the United States was essentially viewed as
a welcome addition to our own sources of capital. Finally, the proposed
Fujitsu and Goodyear transactions may have been the final events that
led Congress to take action to assess and control the extent of direct for-
eign investment in the United States. In assessing what Congress faced in
tackling this economic puzzle, one scholar noted:
The challenge for American policy makers is to continue to reap the
benefits of foreign investment while minimizing its risks. If they fail to
meet this challenge, the threat of losing a measure of political and
Pittsburgh, Youngstown, and other major cities in the great lakes region were also victim-
ized due to their ancillary reliance on the automobile industry. Since the early 1980's, com-
panies and cities located in this region have diversified themselves in order to lessen the
short and long term effects of swings in the economic cycle. Goodyear was an example of
this strategy. In addition to automobile tires, industry participation was extended to com-
puter manufacturing, increased defense related production, natural gas exploration and pro-
duction, and a myriad of other high technology areas where known technology could be
utilized. All of this diversification was subsequently scrapped as a result of Goldsmith's bid.
In order to finance the forced restructuring, Goodyear was required to sell off its non-tire
subdivisions and concentrate on the rubber industry.
67. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
68. See Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1986, at 2, col. 3. Getting its fight to Capitol Hill appeared
to be a last ditch effort on the part of Goodyear. Goodyear chairman Robert Mercer urged
lawmakers to curtail the activities of corporate raiders and conceded that there is "very
little we can do to stop [the British financier's threatened tender offer.] I haven't been opti-
mistic since this started, I'm not sure where we go from here." See, e.g., Wall St. J., Nov. 21,
1986, at 4, col. 1; L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70. Tolchin, supra note 57, at 12.
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economic sovereignty becomes a real possibility."
In responding to this challenge, Congress passed the Exon-Florio
Amendment.
ExON-FLORIo AMENDMENT
Essentially, Exon-Florio gives the President or his designee the abil-
ity to investigate any proposed merger, acquisition or takeover of a
United States Company by foreign persons or entities that may have ad-
verse effects on national security.7 2 As allowed by Exon-Florio, the Presi-
71. Id. at 13.
72. 50 U.S.C. App. 2 158(a), et seq. Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950,
reads as follows:
(a) Investigations. The President or the President's designee may make an in-
vestigation to determine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisi-
tions, and takeovers proposed or pending on or after the date of enactment of
this section by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign control of
persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States. If it is deter-
mined that an investigation should be undertaken, it shall commence no later
than 30 days after receipt by the President or the President's designee of writ-
ten notification of the proposed or pending merger, acquisition, or takeover as
prescribed by regulations promulgated pursuant to this section. Such investiga-
tion shall be completed no later than 45 days after such determination.
(b) Confidentiality of information. Any information or documentary material
filed with the President or the President's designee pursuant to this section
shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States
Code, and no such information or documentary material may be made public,
except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceed-
ing. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent disclosure to ei-
ther House of Congress or to any duly authorized committee or subcommittee
of the Congress.
(c) Action by the President. Subject to subsection (d), the President may take
such action for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or
prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States proposed or pending on or after the date of
enactment of this section by or with foreign persons so that such control will
not threaten to impair the national security. The President shall announce the
decision to take action pursuant to this subsection not later than 15 days after
the investigation described in subsection (a) is completed. The President may
direct the Attorney General to seek appropriate relief, including divestment
relief, in the district courts of the United States in order to implement and
enforce this section.
(d) Findings of the President. The President may exercise the authority con-
ferred by subsection (c) only if the President finds that-
(1) there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the
foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair
the national security, and
(2) provisions of law, other than this section and the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), do not in the President's
judgment provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to pro-
tect the national security in the matter before the President.
The Provisions of subsection (d) of this section shall not be subject to
judicial review.
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dent has delegated his authority to administer the law to the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (the "Committee" or
"CFIUS"). 73 This Committee consists of the Secretaries of the Treasury
(the Chairperson of the Committee), Commerce, Defense and State, as
well as the Attorney General, the chairperson of the Council of Economic
Advisers, the director of the Office of Management and Budget and the
United States Trade Representative.
On July 14, 1989, the Department of the Treasury's office of interna-
tional investment released proposed regulations to implement Exon-
Florio.7 ' Pursuant to such regulations, any party involved in a transaction
subject to Exon-Florio may submit a "voluntary notice" to the Commit-
tee to initiate an investigation to determine whether Presidential action
should be taken.75 Also, any committee member who has reason to believe
a transaction may fall within the purview of Exon-Florio may submit an
"agency notice" to review a proposed transaction s.7  However, although
voluntary in nature, if an acquirer does not submit to the application of
Exon-Florio, the acquirer could face a divestment action or other relief
that the President deems necessary to enforce Exon-Florio.77 Given the
potentially onerous post-acquisition consequences of a Presidential rul-
ing, it is doubtful that merger and acquisition professionals will view this
(e) Factors to be considered. For the purposes of this section, the President or
the President's designee may, taking into account the requirements of national
security, consider among other factors-
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national de-
fense requirements, including the availability of human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies and services, and
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign
citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet
the requirements of national security.
(f) Report to the Congress. If the President determines to take action under
subsection (c), the President shall immediately transmit to the Secretary of the
Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives a written report of the
action which the President intends to take, including a detailed explanation of
the findings made under subsection (d).
(g) Regulations. The President shall direct the issuance of regulations to carry
out this section. Such regulations shall, to the extent possible, minimize
paperwork burdens and shall to the extent possible coordinate reporting re-
quirements under this section with reporting requirements under any other
provision of Federal law.
(h) Effect on other law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or
affect any existing power, process, regulation, investigation, enforcement mea-
sure, or review provided by any other provision of law.
73. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988).
74. Prop. Tress. Reg. § 800.103-800.702, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,744 (1989) (proposed July 14,
1989).
75. Id. at 29,753.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 29,755.
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provision as voluntary.
Assuming notice is provided, any investigation subsequently under-
taken must be commenced within thirty days of the notice 7 and must be
completed within forty-five days.7 9 Once the investigation is completed,
the President has fifteen days to determine whether the transaction
should be blocked. 0 Should the President decide to take action to enjoin
the proposed transaction, he must submit a detailed written report of his
findings to Congress.8 ' It is interesting to note that the investigation and
subsequent action by the President are not subject to judicial review.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
In addition to the "involuntary" nature in which Exon-Florio is ap-
plied, 2 one of the greatest potential problems in the application of the
Exon-Florio Amendment is the determination of when a proposed trans-
action threatens national security. 3 A review of the statute illustrates
that Presidential action will be predicated on a finding that a transaction
will threaten national security.84 The problem lies in the fact that the
statute does not define national security. Moreover, Stephen J. Canner,
the Staff Chairman of CFIUS, has stated: "[B]ecause each transaction is
different, there can be no pre-determined comprehensive list of national
security criteria."85
Therefore, it can be assumed that any final regulations promulgated
to aid in the implementation of Exon-Florio will also be silent as to a
definition of national security. However, a list of factors that should be
78. Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(a), amended
by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, §5021, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988).
79. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(a).
80. Id. at § (c).
81. Id. at § (f).
82. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
83. The language in the statute that places the emphasis upon national security reads
as follows:
(a) Investigations. The President or the President's designee may make an in-
vestigation to determine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisi-
tions, and takeovers proposed or pending on or after the date of enactment of
this section by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign control of
persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States. [emphasis
added].
Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (a), § 721.
84. Id. The following excerpt from the statute highlights when Presidential action
would be appropriate:
(c) Action by the President. Subject to subsection (d), the President may take
such action for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or
prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States proposed or pending on or after the date of
enactment of this section by or with foreign persons so that such control will
not threaten to impair the national security.
85. Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No. 67 (April 10, 1989).
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considered in determining whether a proposed acquisition could impact
national security was provided. These factors are:
1. Domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements;
2. the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national
defense requirements, including the availability of human resources,
products, technology, material, and other supplies and services; and
3. the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by for-
eign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United
States to meet the requirements of national security."0
Although helpful, the list will still allow the President or his designee
unbridled discretion in applying Exon-Florio. Therein lies the potential
for a major problem. Through February 1, 1990, CFIUS had received 243
written notices of transactions. Of these notices, the committee sent only
six to the President for a determination as to whether an investigation
should be commenced. Of this number, only four transactions were subse-
quently subjected to a review.
On February 7, 1989, Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary, announced that the President had decided against
intervening in the proposed acquisition of Monsanto Electronic Material
Company (MEMC) by Huels AG of West Germany.87 The decision by the
President not to intervene in this transaction was significant because the
MEMC-Huels investigation was the first formal investigation by CFIUS
under Exon-Florio.8s MEMC is the largest United States producer of
86. Defense Production Act, §§ 2170(e)(1-3).
87. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 7, 1989.
88. Id. Although the Huels-MEMC transaction was the first to generate a formal inves-
tigation by CFIUS, Exon-Florio was first sought to be applied in the fall of 1988. Consoli-
dated Gold Fields PLC was the target of a hostile takeover attempt by Minorco S.A. Gold
Fields is a U.K. company and Minorco is headquartered in Luxembourg. Gold Fields owned
a forty-nine percent interest in Newmont Mining Corp. Newmont, a Delaware corporation,
owned a controlling interest in Peabody Coal and held other significant minority stakes in
several United States mining and natural resource companies.
Gold Fields asserted that Minorco's takeover attempt was a threat to United States
national security for three reasons:
1) Newmont and its affiliates were involved in the mining and production of
minerals that were vital to national security.
2) Gold Field's other subsidiaries were involved in mining and processing min-
erals outside the United States that were of equal importance to national
security.
3) Gold Fields was a major refiner of gold. The claimed importance of this was
two-fold. First, gold was used in critical defense related electronic components.
Second, maintaining stability in the international gold market was a primary
consideration in maintaining the underlying value of western currencies, in-
cluding the United States dollar.
Gold Fields alleged that Minorco was controlled by South African Harry Oppenheimer.
Given the political tensions between South Africa and the United States, national security
would be compromised if South African interests could gain influence over western curren-
cies and trading relationships. The argument was made that if Oppenheimer gained this
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silicon wafers. In December 1988, the Department of Defense, the De-
partment of Commerce and the General Accounting Office all notified
CFIUS that the proposed transaction should be investigated as the con-
summation of such transaction could impact the integrity of United
States national security.89 In addition, on February 2, 1989, twenty-nine
members of Congress wrote to President Bush and urged him to prevent
the proposed MEMC acquisition."
Although the MEMC-Huels transaction was the subject of extensive
public, administrative and legislative scrutiny, the President refused to
block the transaction. In making the announcement that the President
would not take any action, Mr. Fitzwater provided the following two cri-
teria that must be met before the President would suspend or prohibit a
transaction:
1. Credible evidence to believe that the foreign investor might take
actions that threaten to impair the national security, and
2. that existing laws, other than the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act and the Exon-Florio provision, are inadequate and
inappropriate to deal with the national security threat.9 1
In making this pronouncement, Mr. Fitzwater disclosed that the
President based his decision on the "reliability of supply, technology
transfer, and the relationship of the transaction to the semiconductor in-
dustry research consortium SEMATECH." '92
The second transaction that was the subject of a review was the ac-
quisition of Westinghouse Electric Corporation's interest in a joint ven-
control, the strength of the United States economy would be affected.
Ultimately, CFIUS determined that a full scale investigation was not warranted. On
March 23, 1989, CFIUS announced that the proposed Gold Fields acquisition by Minorco
posed no threat to United States national security. In a rare public statement, CFIUS stated
that even in a worst case scenario, the Gold Fields acquisition by Minorco would pose no
threat to mineral supplies to the United States.
As a general rule, CFIUS activity is confidential. As such, the basis for any CFIUS
ruling under Exon-Florio is not made public and is in fact exempt from Freedom of Infor-
mation Act requests. The release of a public statement by CFIUS was unexpected and is not
likely to be frequently repeated.
89. Tolchin, Monsanto Unit Sale Faces Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1988, at D3, col.
1 (citing Defense News, Dec. 20, 1988). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1989, at D5, col. 4.
90. Congressmen Ask Bush to Block Sale of Wafer Maker to West German Firm, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No. 23 (Feb. 6, 1989). Concern was focused on the manu-
facture of silicon wafers. The assertion was made that if the proposed transaction were con-
summated, the United States share of the silicon wafer world-wide chip market would fall
from fourteen percent to two percent. The congressmen stated this was unacceptable and
noted that" . . . the United States is lagging severely behind its competitors in its ability to
produce computer chips, the virtual sell-off of the wafer industry will help seal the fate of
our weakening high-technology infrastructure ......
91. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 7, 1989.
92. Id. See also Farnsworth, Bush Won't Block Chip Unit's Sale, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1989, at Dl, col. 4. SEMATECH is an industry-government consortium that was formed to
jump-start the United States semiconductor industry.
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ture by its joint venture partner ASEA Brown Boveri Ltd. (ABB). 3 The
ABB-Westinghouse joint venture was involved in the manufacture, distri-
bution, sale and servicing of electrical transmission and distribution
equipment in the United States. In an effort to decrease CFIUS concerns
about the future of the United States' electrical transmission capabilities,
ABB notified CFIUS that it intended to "continue the manufacture, ser-
vicing, repair, research and design in the United States of these high volt-
age transformers."9 ' In asserting the same criteria for Presidential action
as was outlined in the MEMC-Huels investigation, President Bush again
refused to take action.
The third investigation was concluded on August 18, 1989. The trans-
action in question involved the acquisition of three Fairchild Industries
divisions by Matra S.A., a French firm. The three Fairchild divisions
were: Fairchild Communications & Electronics Company, Fairchild Con-
trol Systems Company, and Fairchild Space Company. All three of the
Fairchild divisions and Matra were engaged in the manufacture of hard-
ware and software for aerospace systems and spacecraft. This transaction
did not involve an investigation as much as a negotiation. During the
course of its "investigation," CFIUS sought concessions from Matra to
prevent the export of sensitive computer technologies. Working in concert
with the Department of Commerce, Matra developed and pledged to in-
stitute a comprehensive export control management system that was
viewed as sufficient.9 5 The President, in making his determination that
intervention was unnecessary, determined that the safeguards developed
by Matra and the Department of Commerce were sufficient to protect
sensitive technologies from unauthorized transfer outside the United
States."9
A quick review of the three above referenced transactions, and Presi-
dential inaction, would seem to indicate that Exon-Florio is little more
than a paper tiger.9 7 However, this perception changed with the CFIUS
investigation of the proposed acquisition of General Ceramics, Inc. by
Tokuyama Soda Co. Ltd. of Japan. General Ceramics receives seven per-
cent of its total sales from the sale of beryllium ceramics for military
equipment. Although the proposed transaction was never referred to the
President for official action, CFIUS intervention ultimately caused the
93. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 17, 1989.
94. Id.
95. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, August 18, 1989.
96. Id. The President weighed the proposed safeguards against that criteria first out-
lined in the MEMC transaction and reiterated in the Westinghouse sale.
97. Tolchin, supra note 56. In assessing the impact of CFIUS on international capital
flows into the United States:
CFIUS is known around government circles as a "paper tiger": It rarely meets
and has never to anyone's knowledge, blocked a foreign investment. Consider-
ing that CFIUS is the only foreign-investment review mechanism in the execu-
tive branch, its inactivity speaks volumes about government complacency to-
ward foreign investment.
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
parties to shelve the deal." CFIUS unofficially notified Tokuyama that it
intended to recommend that President Bush block the proposed acquisi-
tion. As a result of this "unofficial" notice, Tokuyama withdrew its
CFIUS notification and agreed to restructure the deal to exclude the Gen-
eral Ceramics division that produces military equipment."
The CFIUS action with respect to the Tokuyama acquisition elicited
praise from Congressmen Exon and Florio. In lauding the aggressive pos-
ture taken by CFIUS, Rep. Florio stated: "[Exon-Florio] is working al-
most exactly as we envisioned it would." 110 If Rep. Florio is accurately
portraying the intent of Congress in passing Exon-Florio, the intended
scope of government intervention is extreme. Such "unofficial" govern-
ment intervention could become a sanctioned form of economic black-
mail. Critics of the CFIUS action have noted that in reviewing proposed
transactions, CFIUS has acted without regard for the potential effect on
national security. In outlining the CFIUS posture on making investigation
recommendations, one opponent noted: "In most cases, it comes down to
a popularity contest . . . . The focus should be on the technology and
whether we want to see it in foreign hands."' 0'1 Thus, it appears as if the
threat of intrusive action by CFIUS has already been realized.
The final investigation undertaken by CFIUS fully illustrates the
scope of presidential power conferred by Exon-Florio. The parties in-
volved in this investigation were MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc.
("MAMCO") and the China National Aero-Technology Import and Ex-
port Corporation ("CATIC"). MAMCO is a company incorporated in the
State of Washington whose principal business is machining and
fabricating metal parts for civilian aircraft. A large proportion of
MAMCO's production is sold to a single manufacturer. Although
MAMCO has no contracts with the U.S. government involving classified
information, some of the machinery it uses during production is subject
to U.S. export controls. CATIC is an export-import company operating
under the direct control of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (the "Ministry"). The Ministry engages in re-
search and development, design, and manufacture of military and com-
mercial aircraft, missiles, and aircraft engines. CATIC has sectors,
including commercial aircraft.
In accordance with the "voluntary" nature of CFIUS notification,
MAMCO notified CFIUS of CATIC's intention to acquire MAMCO. On
November 30, 1989, CATIC completed its purchase of all outstanding
voting stock of MAMCO. CATIC completed this acquisition before
98. Pine, Security Factors Delay Sale of Ceramics Firm, L.A. Times, April 19, 1989, at
§ 4, at 5, col. 1.
99. Id. The General Ceramics unit in question was involved in the manufacture of parts
for nuclear weapons as part of a classified contract with the Department of Energy.
100. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1989, at D6, col. 5.
101. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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CFIUS had completed its review. 102 On December 4, 1989, CFIUS deter-
mined to undertake a formal investigation to determine MAMCO's pre-
sent and potential production capabilities and technology. Specifically,
the investigation focused upon the'national security implications of
CATIC's purchase. To gather information relevant to the CFIUS request,
officials from the Departments of Commerce and Defense, representing
CFIUS, visited MAMCO to conduct an on site investigation. In accor-
dance with the statutory requirements imposed by Exon-Florio, the
CFIUS representatives focused on the presence of any credible evidence
that CATIC might take action which could impair national security. In
addition, CFIUS also focused on the adequacy of any other laws that
were appropriate to deal with the threat presented by CATIC's acquisi-
tion of MAMCO.
After a review of the CFIUS investigation and a consideration of its
recommendations, President Bush ultimately chose to order CATIC to
divest its acquisition of MAMCO. In ordering divestment, the President
ordered and authorized three specific actions:
1. CATIC will have three months in which to divest itself of MAMCO.
2. During the pendency of CATIC's divestment, CFIUS will monitor
the divestment process. The President also authorized CFIUS to take'
measures necessary to ensure protection of the national security.
3. This decision by the President will not have any impact on
CATIC's other business arrangements in the United States.'03
102. Although completion of a proposed acquisition potentially subject to an Exon-
Florio review is not politically astute, nothing in the statute prohibits such action. Further,
nothing in the statute requires the participants in a transaction to notify CFIUS before
consummating any deal. However, given the highly politicized nature of deal making with
respect to CFIUS investigations, it appears that the prudent course would be complete dis-
closure of the change in status of any deal being reviewed by CFIUS.
103. Order Pursuant to § 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. Released by the
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, February 2, 1990. The exact text of the order
reads as follows:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and stat-
utes of the United States of America, including § 721 of the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 1950 ("§ 721"), 50 U.S.C. App. 1270,
Section 1. Findings. I hereby make the following findings:
(1) There is credible evidence that leads me to believe that in exercising
its control of MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc. ("MAMCO"), a corporation incor-
porated under the laws of the State of Washington, the China National Aero-
Technology Import and Export Corporation ("CATIC") might take action that
threatens to impair the national security of the United States of America; and
(2) provisions of law, other than § 721 and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), do not in my judgment provide
adequate and appropriate authority for me to protect the national security in
this matter.
Section 2. Actions Ordered and Authorized. On the basis of the findings
set forth in § 1 of this Order, I hereby order that:
(1) CATIC's acquisition of control of MAMCO and its assets, whether di-
rectly or through subsidiaries or affiliates, is prohibited.
(2) CATIC and its subsidiaries and affiliates shall divest all of their inter-
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Although the impact of Exon-Florio on CATIC was very burdensome
and economically draconic, the President was effusive in distinguishing
the CATIC acquisition from other direct foreign investment. In espousing
the benefit to the United States of an open policy toward foreign invest-
ment, President Bush set forth the following position:
The United States welcomes foreign direct investment in this country;
it provides foreign investors fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory
treatment. This Administration is committed to maintaining that pol-
icy. There are circumstances in which the United States maintains
limited exception to such treatment. Generally these exceptions are
necessary to protect national security. Of those foreign mergers, acqui-
sitions, and takeovers which have been reviewed under the Exon-
Florio provision to determine effects on national security, this is the
first time I have invoked § 721 authority. My action in this case is in
response to circumstances of this particular transaction. It does not
change our open investment policy and is not a precedent for the fu-
ture with regard to direct investment in the United States from the
People's Republic of China or any other country.0 4
est in MAMCO and its assets by May 1, 1990, 3 months from the date of this
Order, unless such date is extended for a period not to exceed 3 months, on
such written conditions as the committee of Foreign Investment in the United
States ("CFIUS") may require. Immediately upon divestment, CATIC shall
certify in writing to CFIUS that such divestment has been effected in accor-
dance with this Order.
(3) Without limitation on the exercise of authority by any agency under
other provisions of law, and until such time as the divestment is completed,
CFIUS is authorized to implement measures it deems necessary and appropri-
ate to verify that operations of MAMCO are carried out in such manner as to
ensure protection of the national security interests of the United States. Such
measures may include but are not limited to the following: On reasonable no-
tice to MAMCO, CATIC, or CATIC's subsidiaries or affiliates (collectively "the
Parties"), employees of the United States Government, as designated by
CFIUS, shall be permitted access to all facilities of the Parties located in the
United States -
(a) to inspect and copy any books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence,
memoranda, and other records and documents in the possession or under the
control of the Parties that concern any matter relating to this Order;
(b) to inspect any equipment, containers, packages, and technical data (in-
cluding software) in the possession or under the control of the Parties; and
(c) to interview officers, employees, or agents of the Parties concerning any
matter relating to this Order.
(4) The Attorney General is authorized to take any steps he deems neces-
sary to enforce this Order.
Section 3. Reservations. I hereby reserve my authority, until such time as
the divestment required by this Order has been completed, to issue further
orders with respect to the Parties as shall in my judgment be necessary to
protect the national security.
Section 4. Publication. This Order shall be published in the Federal
Register.
[signed and dated: George Bush, February 1, 1990]
104. Release to the Congress of the United States, The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, February 2, 1990. Although this was the first "official" action taken under
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Summarizing the 243 transactions referred to CFIUS through Febru-
ary 2, 1990, only three, Tokuyama, MATRA and CATIC were required to
restructure proposed transactions. As such, it would appear as if CFIUS
has acted with restraint in determining the transactions that pose a
threat to "national security."
Unfortunately, there are no assurances that future administrations
will act with similar restraint. Because much of CFIUS activity is con-
ducted under a shroud of secrecy, the potential for abuse appears bound-
less. As such, CFIUS could use its authority to insist that a proposed deal
be restructured or face cancellation.10 5 Further, concessions could be de-
manded from foreign investors that in the long run would hamper the
economic viability of an entity. This is troublesome given the latitude in
defining national security. A future administration may decide that na-
tional security is synonymous with economic security or that promotion
of a national industrial policy is a tenant of national security. Given the
breadth of the statute, the silence of the regulations, and the latitude
given CFIUS in fashioning "unofficial" solution, such a scenario is well
within the realm of possibilities. Further, after the recent action taken to
thwart the CATIC acquisition of MAMCO, CFIUS has put foreign ac-
quirers on notice that no one can ignore the potential impact of Exon-
Florio when planning the acquisition of a United States company.
Another area of potential abuse is in the area of confidential and sen-
sitive business information and trade secrets. Presently, under Exon-
Florio, Congress and members of their staff have access to the confiden-
tial information filed in connection with a Presidential request.'0 6 Al-
though the statute asserts that any information provided in connection
with a request will remain confidential, the potential for disclosure is
great. Congress must by its very nature serve its constituents. Frequently,
members of Congress will be asked by their constituents to address and
intervene in local corporate affairs.10 7 As such, this situation presents a
member of Congress with a dilemma. Should information given to the
President or CFIUS remain confidential, or should we provide a target
company that happens to be a "constituent" with the foreign company's
the guise of Exon-Florio, as a review of previous cases reveals, CFIUS has been able to get
concessions from foreign investors before consummating a transaction. See supra notes 99-
102 and accompanying text. It is this unofficial inquiry and action which presents foreign
acquirers with the greatest potential hurdle in consummating the acquisition of a United
States company when members of CFIUS determine that such an acquisition may impact
national security.
105. A review of the Tokuyama and MATRA proposals confirm this assertion. Given
the pressure exerted by CFIUS in getting the two acquirers to restructure the proposed
deals, it is probable that if concessions were not agreed upon, that CFIUS would have rec-
ommended to the President that the transactions be blocked.
106. See Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, supra note 79 at § 2170(c).
107. An excellent example of this scenario was exhibited in the Goodyear offer by Gold-
smith. As the text implies, Goldsmith may have abandoned his bid to avoid the specter of
legislative intervention.
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takeover plans for the target. It would seem beneficial for members of
Congress to provide their constituents with such information.
Another problem is that any material provided in connection with an
Exon-Florio request may be made available to parties in any "administra-
tive or judicial action or proceeding. 08 Given this availability, any time a
company is threatened with a takeover from a foreign investor, the target
could file suit under a myriad of claims, send a notice to CFIUS, and
subsequently make a request to have all information provided to CFIUS
made public for purposes of trial preparation. Thus, it would seem that
the veil of confidentiality is one that is extremely transparent. In practice,
there is no guarantee whatsoever of confidentiality. This factor alone may
be enough to drive well intentioned foreign investment out of the United
States.
Confidentiality aside, disclosure of the information to Congress car-
ries the threat that the entire review process will be politicized. In form,
CFIUS should be a non-partisan review process that only addresses the
merits of a transaction as they affect "national security." However, by
giving Congress broad latitude in access to CFIUS data, Congress may be
tempted to use such information as ammunition in attempts to derail a
CFIUS decision. Certainly a member of Congress would have much to
gain by publicly second-guessing an unpopular decision by CFIUS.
Exon-Florio may also be misused as an anti-takeover device."0 9 Given
the minimal scrutiny required for a member of CFIUS to call for an in-
vestigation, Exon-Florio could very possibly be used as a deal buster. 1
Should a United States company find itself facing a hostile tender offer, it
will surely seek to invoke Exon-Florio. If defensive management is suc-
cessful in getting CFIUS to initiate an investigation, they could buy
themselves up to ninety days to plot their defensive strategy."' Given the
speed and exactitude under which the majority of hostile tender offers
108. Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, supra note 79, at § (c).
109. Exon-Florio may also come into play in friendly transactions. It is clear that third
parties cannot file notices under Exon-Florio. However, there is nothing in the law that
prevents interested third parties from communicating with the members of CFIUS about
any transaction involving a foreign investor. Further, these interested parties could also
bring their political might to bear on the backs of their members of Congress who could
ultimately influence CFIUS to commence an investigation. The potential list of "interested"
third parties is virtually boundless. Shareholders, institutional investors, employees, major
competitors, labor unions, state and local governments and many other individuals and in-
terest groups possess significant political power. It is very easy to envision the situation
where powerful local constituents of a member of Congress pressures that member to influ-
ence CFIUS to take action. As in the case of disclosing confidential information, it is certain
that at some time, CFIUS and the application of Exon-Florio will become politicized.
110. It only requires the affirmative vote of one member of CFIUS to initiate the review
process. As such, the potential for abuse is staggering. Target management will certainly
seek to maintain close contact with a member of CFIUS during times of siege. By doing so,
the target could provide the CFIUS member with sufficient ammunition to invoke Exon-
Florio and indirectly derail a foreign hostile takeover bid.
111. See generally supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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commence, ninety days in plotting your takeover defense is tantamount
to years of corporate strategy. Thus, it is almost assured that a target,
given ninety days to formulate a defense, could easily find a white knight
or big brother,"' undertake a restructuring defense,1 ' or complete some
other action that would eliminate the threat of a hostile takeover." 4
CONCLUSION
Direct foreign investment in the United States provides significant
economic benefits. Frequently, foreign investment will serve as a stimu-
lant to a depressed area or a company in financial hardship. A recent
example of this impact is Bridgestone's purchase of Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company. Prior to Bridgestone's acquisition, Firestone had con-
112. See Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.
1984); but see, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985). In a
typical white knight/big brother situation, a target's management has made the determina-
tion that the only way they can remain independent is to sell a large block of their stock to
a friendly suitor. Frequently, to entice a friendly suitor, target management may enter into
a "standstill" agreement that limits the white knight's ability to vote its shares and giving
the knight the right to acquire additional shares. Although these agreements may not be in
the best interests of shareholders, the target management can assert the business judgement
rule and claim the takeover bid is not in the best interest of shareholders. Generally, if the
standstill agreement does not consolidate voting power in the hands of management, courts
will allow this defensive measure.
113. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1986); but see AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d (Del.
Ch. Ct. 1986); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Edward P. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. Ct.
1988); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989). Re-
structuring defenses have in the past been very effective in deflecting junk bond and two-
tier takeovers. In theory, a target company that undertakes a corporate restructuring should
be able to provide its shareholders with a better value than is being offered by the suitor.
Arguably, a suitor or raider is proposing the deal to enrich themselves where a restructuring
should inure to the benefit of current shareholders. Further, in a restructuring, it is possible
for current shareholders to maintain an ownership position in the company. As such, this is
frequently viewed as a more palatable alternative than being cashed by a raider. However,
as a practical matter, a restructuring defense may also be used by incumbent management
to enrich themselves.
Another advantage to a restructuring is that a company does not necessarily open itself
up to outside offers when implementing its plan. In this respect, a restructuring is superior
to a white knight strategy. Should it be determined that the directors have offered to sell
the company, and they receive (legitimate) unsolicited offers, the company may subse-
quently be thrust into an auction.
Restructuring defenses may include self tenders, crown jewel sales or sales of attractive
assets, corporate divestitures, and recapitalizations.
114. A complete review of all the defensive measures and tactics available is beyond the
scope of this article. This is an area of the law that undergoes daily permutations. Attempt-
ing to summarize such an area is virtually impossible. However, it is important to know that
problems exist within the structure of Exon-Florio that may enhance the position of target
management in hostile battles for corporate control.
Given this disclaimer, for a complete discussion of the law and strategies that impact
corporate control battles see HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1989 (P.L.I. Nos.
632, 633) (prepared for distribution at the Hostile Battles for Corporate Control Program,
Co-Chairmen Dennis J. Block and Harvey L. Pitt, Feb. 23-24, 1989).
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sidered closing its truck radial tire plant located in La Vergne, Tennessee.
Fortunately for the 1400 workers employed in this location, Bridgestone
was able to keep the plant open. Additionally, the region was spared al-
most certain financial devastation.'1 5 Granted, foreign investment is not
without its drawbacks. 11 However, Exon-Florio is not the proper mecha-
nism in its present form to deal with the concerns being generated over
foreign investment. As written, the law suffers from a severe case of over-
breadth. The potential for abuse is great. The lack of clarity provides
CFIUS with excessive discretion. Finally, there are too many questions
that have been left unanswered by the proposed regulations.
To cure these problems, several solutions have been proposed. One
such proposal was to provide a streamlined no-action procedure that
would allow counsel for the interested parties to seek the equivalent of a
Securities and Exchange Commission no-action position to the effect that
the President would take no enforcement action under Exon-Florio."'
Another workable proposal called for the inclusion of explicit regulatory
exemptions for transactions involving specified types of industries."' The
argument for this proposal is that the damage Exon-Florio could wreak
on the economy would be minimized without compromising the integrity
of national security." 9 Thus, it is clear there are solutions to the problems
posed by Exon-Florio. Additionally, if action is not taken to eliminate the
potential draconian impact of Exon-Florio, United States companies may
see the international demand for their securities drastically reduced. Not
only would this affect the long term market value of a company's securi-
ties, American shareholders would also suffer adverse economic conse-
quences. As such, we should all think twice before jumping on the band-
wagon in support of Exon-Florio.
115. For a complete discussion of Bridgestone's efforts, see Tolchin, supra note 56, at
63, 81-93, 269.
116. Id. at 16-32, 259-274. See also Note, An Evaluation of the Need for Further Stat-
utory Controls on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 147, 182-187; Little, The Impact of Acquisition by Foreigners on the Financial Health of
the U.S., NEw ENG. ECON. REV., Jul./Aug. 1982, at 40; Roberts, A Minefield of Myths, Bus.
WK., Jan. 28, 1985, at 18; Reich & Mankin, Joint Ventures with Japan Give Away our
Future, 64 HARV. Bus. REV., Mar./Apr. 1986, at 78.
117. See Wall St. J., August 30, 1989, at A10, col. 3. This suggestion was put forth by
Susan W. Liebeler, former chairperson of the United States International Trade Commis-
sion, 1986-88.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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